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ABSTRACT 
Many human computation systems utilize crowdsourcing marketplaces to recruit workers. Because of the open nature of 
these marketplaces, requesters need to use appropriate quality assurance mechanisms to guarantee high quality results. 
Previous research has mostly focused on the statistical aspects of quality assurance. Instead, we analyze the worker 
perception of five quality assurance mechanisms (Qualification Test, Qualification Restriction, Gold Standard, Majority 
Vote, Validating Review) according to subjective (fairness, offense, benefit) and objective (necessity, accuracy, cost) criteria. 
Based on theory from related areas like labor psychology, we develop a conceptual model and test it with a survey on 
Mechanical Turk. Our results show big differences in perception, especially with respect to Majority Vote which is rated low 
by workers. On the basis of these results, we show implications for theory and give requesters on crowdsourcing markets the 
advice to integrate the worker view when selecting an appropriate quality assurance mechanism.  
Keywords 
Quality Assurance, Survey, Crowdsourcing, Human Computation, Mechanical Turk, Majority Vote, Labor Psychology  
INTRODUCTION  
Human Computation has emerged as a powerful new paradigm where humans and computers work together to solve hard 
problems that neither of them can solve alone (Quinn and Bederson, 2011). For example, many tasks like content 
development, data tagging, natural language processing, image understanding, or knowledge representation are still very hard 
or impossible to solve by computers, yet very easy to perform by humans (Yampolskiy, 2012). The human computation 
paradigm attempts to use the combined capabilities of humans and computers to solve these problems. Many human 
computation systems use crowdsourcing marketplaces to recruit workers. 
 
The term “Crowdsourcing,” the act of outsourcing tasks to a large and undefined group of people in the form of an open call 
(Howe, 2008), is used for a wide variety of applications in areas like collaborative knowledge creation (Wikipedia), open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003), or competition markets (Leimeister et al., 2009). For this paper, however, we focus on a 
narrower definition of crowdsourcing marketplaces that can be used to dynamically recruit workers for human computation 
systems. The most prominent example is Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a marketplace for work where businesses and 
developers (“requesters”) can get access to an on-demand, scalable workforce (“workers”). Requesters post Human 
Intelligence Tasks (“HITs”) that are then self-selected by the workers who perform the work and submit the results back to 
the system. Workers can flexibly select work of different kinds and from different requesters and are paid on a per-task basis 
where most tasks are micro tasks that can be completed in a few minutes.  
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Because of the novel open call format where anonymous workers self-select the tasks, requesters have to overcome the 
challenge of ensuring high quality results. Some workers submit incorrect results because they are not qualified for the work, 
make careless mistakes, or are simply trying to submit random results to game the systems (Downs et al., 2010). Several 
statistical quality assurance mechanisms (QAMs) have been proposed to manage the quality in this setting. First, the worker 
population that is allowed to work on the task can be restricted by qualification restrictions or qualification tests (Kazai, 
2010). For tasks like data categorization and labeling, which have a limited answer space and one objectively verifiable 
correct solution, majority vote approaches can be applied where the same task is performed by multiple workers and the 
answers are compared (Kern et al., 2011). Some providers like CrowdFlower use “gold standard” units where tasks with 
known answers are injected into the work stream to infer the quality of a worker on other tasks (Oleson et al., 2011). In the 
case where different answers can be correct (like content creation or translation), peer review approaches can be employed 
where the submitted results are verified by different workers (Sun et al., 2011). 
 
Most of these approaches treat the human submissions to the tasks as mere noisy input data that has to be cleaned up with 
statistical techniques in order to reduce costs giving desired quality levels or to maximize quality giving budget restrictions. 
However, little research has been done on the impact that these systems have on the workers that perform the tasks. Given a 
specific quality assurance approach, good workers might be discouraged to put full effort into performing a task or even 
decide to not perform the task at all; thus the initial data quality that can be utilized in the statistical approaches is reduced. In 
this case, requesters might be inclined to use different approaches that are perceived more positively by workers. As a first 
step in exploring this area, we want to answer the following research question: 
 
• How do workers on crowdsourcing marketplaces perceive different quality assurance mechanisms according to subjective 
and objective criteria? 
To answer this question, we develop a preliminary conceptual model based on related areas and test it in a quantitative survey 
on MTurk.  
RELATED WORK AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Comprehensive work has been performed on the theoretical and practical foundations of quality assurance in crowdsourcing. 
But to the best of our knowledge, the perception of quality assurance mechanisms has not yet been studied in the context of 
crowdsourcing markets. However, similar approaches have been analyzed in other areas like business, economics, or 
psychology and can therefore support the theoretical foundation of our model. 
Quality Assurance Mechanisms in Crowdsourcing 
Qualification Test (QT). Many crowdsourcing platforms offer requesters the ability to design qualification tests. Workers 
need to pass these tests before they are allowed to work on actual tasks. This mechanism can be used to train workers, 
illustrate what answers are expected, or to test the skills and abilities of workers. While these qualification tests can filter out 
bad workers, it could also discourage honest workers who are not willing to invest time in a test with unknown prospects of 
future earning potential (Wais et al., 2010). On the other hand, workers could put great effort into passing the test and then 
reduce this effort on the actual task.  
 
Qualification Restriction (QR). Qualification-based restrictions limit the approved worker pool by certain qualitative or 
quantitative metrics (Schulze, Krug, et al., 2012). These are usually combinations of the quantity of historical work and the 
quality of or satisfaction with historical work; e.g., MTurk uses the “HIT approval rate” and the number of “total approved 
HITs.” Workers can usually acquire these reputations by completing other tasks on the platform. One problem with global 
restrictions lies in the fact that the skills of workers might be task specific, e.g., workers who are experienced in image 
tagging are not necessarily skilled in translation as well. Also, worker quality might change over time. 
 
Gold Standard (GS). Currently, many crowdsourcing providers typically use the gold standard data sets to evaluate worker 
quality. The main idea behind this method is that tasks with known answers are mixed into the stream of regular tasks that 
workers process. If a worker’s responses deviate significantly from the gold standard, this procedure can be employed to 
automatically reject such poorly performed contributions or to help the worker to learn what is required. Obviously, this 
method belongs to test mechanisms that can be used throughout completing the tasks to filter out non-serious workers. Thus, 
the gold standard questions should be selected carefully so that they cannot be differentiated from regular tasks and do not 
dupe good workers. 
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Majority Vote (MV). A substantial body of the literature focuses on quality assurance for micro tasks, such as data 
categorization or image labeling. A widespread method to evaluate results of these tasks is majority voting (Sorokin and 
Forsyth, 2008). This technique compares or aggregates multiple results provided by different workers to the same task in 
order to derive a single correct result or the result with highest probability of correctness (Ipeirotis et al., 2010; Jung and 
Lease, 2011).  One drawback of this approach lies in the fact that, if worker are not trusted or the result is not of desired 
correctness, the system passes the same task to other workers and causes more costs.  Another risk is that the consolidation of 
two or more false answers can vote down the correct result. 
 
Validating Review (VR). In case that the tasks are not deterministic (e.g., language translation or creative design) so that 
multiple results can be considered valid, validating review (also known as peer review) is used for quality assurance. This 
method leverages a reviewer or a group of reviewers to assess the results submitted by other workers (Kern et al., 2010). 
Validating review can discourage good workers since correct results can be voted down by incorrect reviews. 
 
To keep our selection simple, we only use these five mechanisms for our study. There are other ways, e.g., iterative 
approaches where a second worker improves the results of the initial submission (Little et al., 2010), improved peer review, 
where majority vote is used to assess the work quality instead of just a single vote (Kern et al., 2010), or techniques that are 
transparent to the user like using implicit behavioral measures to predict task performance (Rzeszotarski and Kittur, 2011).  
Perception of Quality Assurance Mechanisms 
Cornell and Welch (1996) establish a simple model that explains how discrimination can develop during pre-screening of 
people and how the similarity of the general background between applicants and employers influences hiring decisions. The 
goal behind the screening process is to select the best workers from the pool of job applicants by disclosure of their intangible 
characteristics. The screening process should be performed primarily in sectors where inferred worker quality is of high 
importance and where it is more efficient to pre-screen employees than to measure their performance afterwards (Cornell and 
Welch, 1996). 
 
Harris et al. (1990) analyze the perception of different pre-employment screening procedures by human resource prac-
titioners. Respondents were requested to rate pre-employment tests on attributes like offensiveness, discrimination, accuracy, 
fakeability, costs, etc. for different job types. Targeted interviews and accomplishment tests were perceived to be most 
accurate and least expensive. None of the applicant screening procedures were viewed as particularly discriminatory whereas 
biological and physiological measures were rated as offensive, least accurate, and most costly. Honesty and personality tests 
were seen as relatively easy to fake whereas cognitive ability tests were regarded to be hardly fakeable (Harris et al., 1990). 
 
In contrast to the above study, Ryan and Sackett (1987) analyze the perception of screening tests from the applicants’ 
perspective. Their study addresses the reaction of applicants to honesty tests and examines the impact of taking such a test on 
employees’ perception of the company image. They ask students about fairness of honesty tests, feelings of being offended, 
privacy issues, rejection of job offers, etc. Most participants consider the application of honesty tests as appropriate and not 
detrimental to the company image (Ryan and Sackett, 1987). 
 
For a comprehensive review of the research on applicant perceptions of screening processes we refer to the work of Ryan and 
Ployhart (2000). Among other things, they summarize what are perceptions having been studied, what are parameters of 
perceptions, and what are the outcomes of holding more positive or negative perceptions. 
PRELIMINARY RESEARCH MODEL 
Since the term perception is always connected with emotions, we first examine related works in affective science, the study 
of emotion or affect. The primary challenge is to distinguish between different layers of emotions and, consequently, between 
the ones of worker perception of QAMs. Calhoun (2004) points out that there are two general types of emotions: subjective 
and objective emotions. While subjective emotions are defined to be biographical charged, objective emotions are described 
to be epistemic. In contrast to subjective emotions, epistemic objective emotions project the truth and reality. However, pure 
objectivity does not exist since everything is processed through the individual point of view. Transferring statements of 
Calhoun (2004) to our model, we split worker perception of QAMs into the following two layers: biographical subjective 
perception and epistemically objective perception. 
 
In our model, biographical subjective perception defines a layer of all subjective emotions of a worker. Each worker can 
develop individual emotions for the same task and thus can perceive a QAM differently. In contrast, epistemically objective 
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perception describes the point of view of a person without any subjective estimation. Even if it is not possible to achieve pure 
objectivity, it is feasible to eliminate the personal bias and incorporate the interests of a group of people (Calhoun, 2004). 
Accordingly, working on tasks in crowdsourcing platforms workers cannot act absolutely objective but they can judge 
consequences of a task’s execution from a general point of view. 1 
 
The next step in the development of our model deals with the identification of specific attributes of the subjective and 
objective perception. As a starting point for this, we use the work of Lomas (1994) which establishes several characteristics 
of subjective and objective perception: Subjective perception can be characterized as personal, internal, emotional, intuitive, 
limitless, etc., while objective perception is defined to be impersonal, external, intellectual, scientific, limited, etc. The work 
of Lomas (1994) was taken as a basis for our model and extended by other properties established in the related literature in 
the previous section in the context of the QAMs considered. Figure 1 shows the resulting model in which subjective 
perception is divided into fairness, offense, and benefit, and objective perception consists of the characteristics necessity, 
accuracy, and costs. The detailed classification of all characteristics with respect to each layer is given in the next two 
subsections.   
 
 
Worker Perception of Quality Assurance Mechanisms
Subjective Perception Objective Perception
Fairness Offense Benefit Necessity Accuracy Costs
Qualification 
Restrictions
Qualification 
Test
Majority 
Vote
Gold 
Standard
Validating 
Review
 
Figure 1. Preliminary Model on Worker Perception of Quality Assurance Mechanisms 
 
Subjective Perception 
Based on the findings from the previous section, as well as on further studies concerned with applicants’ perception issues 
(Gilliland, 1993; Macan et al., 1994; Ryan and Sackett, 1987), several factors characterizing the subjective perception of 
different selection and screening processes can be identified. Fairness, offense, and benefit are the three core factors which 
emerge as most determinative and, according to Lomas (1994), can be classified into the layer of the biographical subjective 
perception: 
                                                          
1
 A very helpful reviewer points out that the distinction between subjective perception (i.e., the worker’s view) and objective 
perception (i.e., the requester’s view) could also be framed as a principal-agent problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). 
Because the interests of the requester are usually not in line with the interests of the worker, an asymmetric information 
distribution and moral hazard might lead to several problems that are worth studying from an economic theoretical 
background. We see this as a very interesting direction for future research.   
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• Fairness with its various forms is the most frequently used characteristic of perception. In the research review by Ryan and 
Ployhart (2000) on applicants’ perceptions of screening processes, this factor is considered in 21 of 40 analyzed studies. 
The intuitive nature of fairness is confirmed by Tabibnia et al. (2008). Since fairness in this context satisfies the essential 
properties of subjective perception pointed out by Lomas (1994), we group it into the layer of biographical subjective 
perception. 
• Offense appears to be the next important factor related to subjective emotions perceived during a selection process or a pre-
screening test. Harris et al. (1990) indicate differences between test types in terms of perceived offense and determine it as 
a factor seeming to affect tests’ usage. The study by Ryan and Sackett (1987) shows that applicants consider certain types 
of pre-employment tests to be more offensive than the other ones. Aquino et al. (2006) observe that when employers follow 
certain rules in response to an offense feeling, employees see that fairness is implemented and feel appreciated by 
management. Thus, offense is closely linked to the workers’ perception of fairness.  
• One further factor that has the potential to influence employee performance, motivation, attitude, or satisfaction is the 
perception of the benefits offered by the management (Balkin and Griffeth, 1993; Iles et al., 1990). Benefits are not always 
measured as monetary compensations but can also represent intangible issues (Weathington and Tetrick, 2000).  
Objective Perception 
Objective perception represents the second layer of our model and considers the worker perception of QAMs from the point 
of view of the requester. Based on objective criteria for worker perception of different selection procedures pointed out in the 
previous section and taking into consideration the key challenge in crowdsourcing, namely to ensure high-quality processing 
of tasks, we recognized the following core factors in this context: necessity, accuracy, and costs: 
 
• Since one of the great challenges of crowdsourcing is to extract high quality results from an a priori unknown population of 
workers, the necessity of some sort of QAM is obvious from the perspective of a requester (Kern et al., 2009). We include 
this aspect of necessity in the model in order to evaluate whether an individual worker also understands the need of these 
approaches.  
• Harris et al. indicate substantial differences between the results of pre-employment screening procedures in terms of 
perceived accuracy (Harris et al., 1990). Studying this fact, Sacket and Wilk found out that performance on the test is 
closely linked to performance on the work (Sackett and Wilk, 1994).  
• Cost reduction is one aspect often mentioned as a big advantage of crowdsourcing (Schenk and Guittard, 2011). However, 
this objective is opposed to the goal of most workers who want to earn as much money as possible (Kaufmann et al., 2011). 
Still, by using a certain QAM, the requester might be able to reduce the monetary amount paid to dishonest workers so that 
good work can be rewarded.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the theoretical foundations by developing a definition in the context of crowdsourcing and human 
computation marketplaces. The definitions are partly adapted from the literature mentioned before. 
 
In additional questions, general data about the registration period and the weekly time effort as well as the workers’ HIT 
statistic (total approved HITs, number of assigned qualifications, HIT approval rate) and demographics (gender, age, level of 
education) was collected. Due to space limitations, answers for some questions are not reported in this paper. In order to filter 
out non-serious workers who do not really read every task, we injected different gold standard questions into our 
questionnaire. The results of respondents who answered at least one of the spamming questions wrongly were not used for 
the analysis.  
 
The survey was published on the MTurk platform in May 2012 with the title “Survey about Quality Assurance on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk” with payment of $0.26 for every completed task and about 15 minutes scheduled for its completion. These 
values correspond to 70% of the average wage per hour of a worker on MTurk (Ross et al., 2010). In order to reduce the 
effects of cultural differences (Kaufmann et al., 2011), only participants form the USA were allowed. The survey was 
available on the platform for one week and led to 170 submitted HITs. After filtering out potential spammers, 159 responses 
to the full survey are used for the data analysis. 
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 Definition (in the Crowdsourcing context) Survey Item 
From the point of view of a worker, I think 
that this quality assurance mechanism … 
Fairness Refers to the condition that a worker that behaves 
correctly is treated acceptably by the mechanism; 
and non-serious workers cannot take advantage of 
correctly behaving persons. 
... treats everybody equally, so nobody has 
an advantage. 
Offense Refers to an emotional state of annoyance or anger 
towards the system or the requester. 
... annoys me and makes me angry. 
Benefit Refers to the individual profit of the worker 
measured in a monetary or non-monetary value. 
... enables me to earn more money. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Subjective Perception 
 
 Definition (in the Crowdsourcing context) Survey Item 
From the point of view of a requester, I 
believe that this quality assurance 
mechanism is a way to ... 
Necessity Refers to the objective need to use an approach in 
order to achieve a desired purpose or goal. 
... achieve overall results of higher quality. 
Accuracy Refers to the degree of quality of the crowd output 
compared to the correct or optimal result. 
... motivate workers to submit better work. 
Costs Refers to the overall monetary amount a requester 
has to reward to workers in order to complete a 
project with required quality. 
... reduce the total amount of money 
needed to complete a project. 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Objective Perception 
 
DATA ANALSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Data Analysis Method 
We use IBM SPSS Statistics (v20) to analyze the data. First, we look at the perception of the five different QAMs by ranking 
them individually according to the six different aspects. We use the “Friedman” test for the ranking and pairwise “Wilcoxon 
signed-rank” tests to check if differences in the median are significant. We also report the median and quartiles for each test. 
Next, we analyze each QAM individually. Since absolute values have limited explanatory power for Likert scale data, we use 
these scales to compare differences based on the demographic questions (by forming two or more sub-groups for the 
comparison). As we only use one item per model construct, the Likert scales have to be considered as being ordinal and we 
employ the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon-U-Test (Boone and Boone, 2012; Schulze, Indulska, et al., 2012).  
Overall results 
The overall descriptive results are depicted in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the quartiles of the survey results for each 
question that we asked for the five different QAMs. Additionally, we include the proportion of people who (strongly) agree 
with the statement. To clarify the results, we also order the results and display them in a different form in Table 4. Overall, 
the results suggest that Qualification Test, Qualification Restriction, and Gold Standard have a high standing with the 
workers, while Validating Review is seen neutrally. Majority Vote has the lowest assessment with the workers in most 
categories; it is especially perceived as being unfair and offensive and many workers do not see the benefit for the requesters 
at all. However, while many workers do not like Majority Vote, they realize its potential to decrease the costs for requesters.  
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Qualification 
Test 
Qualification 
Restriction Majority Vote Gold Standard Validating Review 
   Quartiles Agree Quartiles Agree Quartiles Agree Quartiles Agree Quartiles Agree 
Fairness 3 4 5 72% 3 4 4 64% 2 3 4 38% 3 4 4 64% 3 3 4 64% 
Offense 1 2 3 13% 2 3 4 29% 2 3 4 40% 2 2 3 13% 2 3 4 13% Worker View 
Benefit 3 4 4 60% 2 3 4 47% 2 3 4 28% 3 3 4 50% 2 3 4 50% 
Necessity 4 4 5 80% 4 4 5 75% 3 4 4 51% 3 4 5 72% 3 4 4 72% 
Accuracy 3 4 5 70% 3 4 5 67% 3 3 4 47% 3 4 5 69% 3 4 4 69% Requester View 
Costs 2 3 4 40% 3 3 4 45% 3 3 4 44% 3 3 4 39% 3 3 4 39% 
Table 3. Survey Results. The cells include the quartiles (25%, median, 75%). N = 159 survey participants. 5-point Likert-scale from 
“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). "Agree" is the percentage of people who answered 4 (agree) or strongly agree (5). 
 
  Fairness Offense Benefit Necessity Accuracy Costs 
Qualification Test 1 4 1 1 1 4 
Qualification 
Restriction 2 2 2 2 3 1 
Majority Vote 5 1 5 5 5 1 
Gold Standard 2 4 2 2 1 1 
Validating Review 4 2 4 4 4 4 
  
1 = fair 
5 = unfair 
1 = offensive 
5 = not offensive 
1 = beneficial 
5 = not beneficial 
1 = required 
5 = not required 
1 = Higher quality 
5 = Lower quality 
1 = Lower cost 
5 = Higher cost 
Table 4. Ranking of Quality Assurance Mechanisms. For each category, the numbers indicate the relative position when comparing 
the five mechanisms. If non-parametric tests show no significant difference, two or more positions are grouped. Note: For “offense”, less 
offensive is better. 
 
The data shows that the survey participants are very well aware of the two QAMs that are openly visible on MTurk. QT 
(81%) and QR (86%) have been encountered “Sometimes,” “Very Often,” or “Always.” The other three mechanisms that 
work in the background are less well known (MV 57%, VR 50%, GS 40%). Negative experiences with the mechanisms are 
common for all participants. About one third of the participants (QT 31%, QR 33%, MV 36%) remember having had 
problems with the mechanism at least sometimes. The results are lower for VR (19%) and GS (20%).  
 
However, when looking at the combination of frequency and negative experience, the data shows that negative experiences 
are strongly associated with frequency of occurrence. In other words, many workers only realize that one of the background 
mechanisms is in use when they have a negative experience. If the survey participants are aware that a HIT on MTurk uses 
one of the QAMs, this has no influence for a majority of them. However, many workers are less likely to work on tasks using 
MV (40%) or VR (26%). Some workers (26%) also do not like to take a Qualification Test.  
 
Again, these results are worse once the workers repeatedly encounter the mechanism or had negative experiences. If this is 
the case, they are significantly less inclined to work on future tasks given certain QAMs. These results suggest that poorly 
implemented QAMs can leave a long lasting negative impression. 
Influence of demographics 
After describing the overall results, we form groups of survey participants based on the demographic information and analyze 
the effect on the QAM ratings. Since many requesters are interested in finding the best trained workers and keeping them for 
their tasks (Ipeirotis, 2011), our goal is to understand the view of those workers that spend a lot of time on MTurk, have a 
high number of approved HITs, and a high HIT approval rate.  
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The results show that workers who spend a long time per week on MTurk (more than 20 hours, N=31) rank Majority Vote 
and Validating Review significantly less fair, less beneficial, and unnecessary. Thus, they are significantly less willing to 
work on tasks that use one of these two mechanisms. They also try to avoid gold standards. For workers with high quality 
results (self-reported HIT approval rate of 99% or higher; N = 67), the results are similar.  
 
Overall, when the results are filtered according to experienced and non-experienced workers, the data shows that experienced 
workers realize that the “background” mechanisms have a negative impact in terms of the worker-view aspects. These 
experienced workers do not like to see their results compared to or evaluated by others. 
 
The level of education had very little impact on the results. This is consistent with earlier work that suggests that the skills 
required for crowdsourcing are different from “formal education” and more specific capabilities like computer skills, 
language, or web navigation are required to perform tasks on MTurk (Schulze et al., 2011). The only interesting significant 
result is that workers with a Bachelor’s degree or higher understand the necessity of the gold standard better.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Implications for theory 
Our conceptual model contributes to theory in two ways. First, we have taken theory from related work in psychology, 
business, economics, affective science, etc. and applied it to the domain of online labor markets. The special characteristics of 
these labor markets is that the responsibility for matching tasks with adequate employees is mostly performed by the workers 
rather than Human Resources (Schulze, Krug, et al., 2012). Our work suggests that theory from traditional labor settings can 
be adapted to these new conditions and can contribute to further research in the worker view on these online labor markets. 
Second, we contribute to the area of statistical quality assurance in Human Computation. We show that the effect of the 
mechanism on the worker can be significant on the composition of the worker pool. This knowledge may be useful for the 
development of new and better QAMs, especially for approaches aiming at improving the initial data quality.  
Implications for practice 
Due to space limitations, only selected results could be mentioned in the previous chapter. Still, we have performed 
additional statistical analyses to test these implications. Based on the results of the study, we can formulate the following 
guidelines for platform operators and requesters: 
 
Choice and Design of Mechanism. Approaches where the skills are tested before beginning the task (Qualification Test) or 
the worker population is restricted beforehand (Qualification Restriction) are generally accepted by the workers. Workers do 
not like Majority Vote which can be explained by the fact that the “correct” answer may be rejected if it disagrees with the 
“wrong” majority. We therefore strongly suggest that Majority Vote should not be the criterion to decide whether workers are 
paid or not. We would rather recommend that quality management and remuneration are viewed separately, i.e., that workers 
are still paid for all their work as long their rating is high enough (as opposed to punishing every single disagreement with the 
majority). Independently, an appropriate statistical approach can still be used to clean the results. If Gold Standard is used, it 
should be implemented carefully so that negative experiences (e.g., a correct answer is rejected) can be avoided for the 
experienced workers who sidestep tasks with this mechanism after negative experiences. Validating Review should ensure 
that the review process is thorough, i.e., that the chance of rejection of correct work is minimized.  
 
Communication of Mechanism used. Requesters should clearly communicate the QAM used, the reason why it is used, and 
how the results will affect the workers in terms of payment and potential rejection. While this approach might discourage 
some workers from working on the task at all, it seems better than surprising honest workers with a feeling of being treated 
unfairly once a negative experience reveals the underlying mechanism. While we have not explicitly studied this potential 
effect, comments from the workers confirm that the exact design of a mechanism and the wording of explanations are 
important. This has been studied by Shaw et al. (2011) for a content analysis task. 
 
Since our analysis was exploratory, all these findings should be tested again in a formal experiment. Depending on the task 
type, the complexity of a task, and the overall worker population, the implications for practice might be different.  
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CONCLUSION 
Utilizing crowdsourcing marketplaces can be a convenient and cost-efficient way to recruit workers for human computation 
systems. Because of the open nature of most of these marketplaces, requesters need to utilize appropriate quality assurance 
mechanisms in order to validate the submitted results and to decide how much to pay to which worker. Previous research has 
mostly either focused on the statistical aspects of quality assurance, thus treating the worker as mere “noisy input,” or dealt 
with alternative ways to motivate workers to submit results of higher quality. In contrast, we directly analyze the worker 
perception of well-known quality assurance mechanisms according to subjective and objective criteria. Based on theory from 
related areas, we develop a conceptual model and test it with a survey on Mechanical Turk. Our results show that the 
perception of the mechanisms is indeed different, especially with respect to the Majority Vote approach. Based on our results, 
we give the requesters on crowdsourcing markets the advice to integrate the worker view when selecting an appropriate 
mechanism.  
 
As a first exploratory analysis of the research question, the results might not directly be applicable to any real world cases. 
Improving worker perception should only be one auxiliary means -besides other considerations like task type or task 
characteristics- when implementing an appropriate QAM. Related questions concerning the influence of QAMs on task 
performance are also not part of the analysis in this paper. In future work, the findings will therefore be tested in a controlled 
experiment that incorporates other metrics instead of just worker perception in order to analyze its importance more 
rigorously. Alternatively, the results can form the basis for a structural model that formally analyzes work intention based on 
the different aspects.  
 
The presented study is not without limitations. The survey method used for the study might have led to a selection bias of the 
participants. It is unclear whether the population of the survey participants is equal to the population of the MTurk platform; 
and whether the quality assurance mechanisms used within the survey might have further biased the task selection. Since the 
MTurk platform is very open and empirical evidence shows that it attracts many dishonest workers and requesters, the results 
might not apply to other platforms with more control, i.e., external reliability might be limited; however, existing research 
indicates that rating scales are perceived differently by crowd workers (Riedl et al., 2013). To have a brief and concise model, 
we have limited it to three subjective and three objective aspects. We cannot be sure that these aspects are indeed the most 
important ones on MTurk. Future qualitative research, e.g., through informal interviews, could evaluate the robustness of the 
model. Finally, the research might benefit from being viewed from different theoretical lenses, e.g.m using principal-agent 
theory and related economic theories.  
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